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Abstract
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the
question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, wel-
fare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question
is important as it allows us to learn about the valuation distribution in a robust
way, i.e., without assuming that a particular information structure holds across
observations. We leverage the recent contributions of Bergemann and Morris
[2013] in the robust mechanism design literature that exploit the link between
Bayesian Correlated Equilibria and Bayesian Nash Equilibria in incomplete in-
formation games to construct an econometrics framework for learning about
auction fundamentals using observed data on bids. We showcase our construc-
tion of identified sets in private value and common value auctions. Our approach
for constructing these sets inherits the computational simplicity of solving for
correlated equilibria: checking whether a particular valuation distribution be-
longs to the identified set is as simple as determining whether a linear program
is feasible. A similar linear program can be used to construct the identified
set on various welfare measures and counterfactual objects. For inference and
to summarize statistical uncertainty, we propose novel finite sample methods
using tail inequalities that are used to construct confidence regions on sets.
We also highlight methods based on Bayesian bootstrap and subsampling. A
set of Monte Carlo experiments show adequate finite sample properties of our
inference procedures. We illustrate our methods using data from OCS auctions.
Keywords: inference, auctions, Bayes-correlated equilibrium, information ro-
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1 Introduction
A recent literature in robust mechanism design studies the following question: given
a game (e.g. an auction), what are the possible outcomes - such as welfare or revenue
- that arise under different information structures? This literature is motivated by
robustness, i.e., characterizing outcomes that can occur in a given game under weak
assumptions on information (See Bergemann and Morris [2013]). For example, in
auction models, in addition to specifying the details of the game in terms of bidder
utility function, and bidding rules, one needs to specify the information structure
(what players know about the state of the world and the information possessed by
other players) to be able to derive the Nash equilibrium.
In particular, in the Independent Private Values (IPV) setting, players know their
value for the item, which is assumed independent from other player values, and re-
ceive no further information about their opponents’ values. The latter typically yields
a unique equilibrium outcome. However, different assumptions on what signals players
have about opponent values prior to bidding in the auction, lead to different equilib-
rium outcomes. Auction data rarely contain information on what bidders knew and
what their information sets included, and given that this information leads to different
outcomes, it would be interesting to analyze what can happen when we relax the inde-
pendence assumption in such auctions by allowing bidders to know some information
about their opponents’ valuations. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris [2017] (BBM)
examine exactly this question in an auction game and provide achievable bounds on
various outcomes, such as the revenue of the auction as a function of auction funda-
mentals like the distribution of the common value.
In this paper, we address the following econometrics question, which is the reverse
of the one posed by BBM above: given an i.i.d. sample of auction data (independent
copies of bids from a set of auctions), what can we learn about auction fundamentals,
such as the distribution of values, when we make weak assumptions on the information
structure? We maintain throughout that players play according to a Bayesian Nash
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equilibrium (BNE) but allow these bidders to have different information structures in
different auctions, i.e. receive different types of signals prior to bidding. In particular,
we use these observations (bids and other observables) from a set of independent
auctions to construct sets of valuation distributions that are consistent with both the
observed distribution of bids and the known auction rules maintaining that players are
Bayesian. We exploit the robust predictions in a given auction a` la BBM to conduct
econometrically robust predictions of auction fundamentals given a set of data; i.e.,
robust economic prediction leads to robust inference.
Key to our approach is the characterization of sharp sets of valuation distributions
(and other functionals of interest) via computationally attractive procedures. This is
a result of the equivalence between a particular class of Bayes Correlated Equilbria (or
BCE) and Bayes Nash Equilibria (or BNE) for a similar game with an arbitrary infor-
mation structure. It is well known that BCE can be computed efficiently since they are
solutions to linear programs (as opposed to BNE which are hard to compute). More-
over, exploiting a result of Bergemann and Morris [2016] (see also Aumann [1987]),
we show that there is an equivalence between the set of fundamentals that obey the
BCE restrictions and the fundamentals that obey the BNE constraints under some
information structure. This equivalence is the key to our econometrics approach. The
formal statistics program that ensues is one where the sharp set satisfies a set of
linear equality and inequality constraints. If we knew the true distribution of bids,
then identifying the parameters would be a simple computational problem of solving
a linear program. We do not observe the true bid distribution, but this distribution
can be estimated consistently from the observed data. Thus, we use the estimated bid
distribution to solve for an estimate of the identified set. We are also able to char-
acterize sampling uncertainty to obtain various notions of confidence regions covering
the identified with a prespecified probability.
In addition to learning about auction primitives, we show how our approach using
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data on auctions can be used to construct identified sets for auction welfare measures,
seller surplus and other objects. Information on auction primitives, along with these
measures obtained using our procedures that combine data with the theory, can be
used to guide future market designers to better study particular auction setups (or
use our results in other markets).
Importantly, we address the problem of counterfactual estimation: what would the
revenue or surplus have been had we changed the auction rules? We formulate notions
of informationally robust counterfactual analysis and we show that such counterfactual
questions can also be phrased as solutions to a single linear program, simultaneously
capturing equilibrium constraints in the current auction as well as the new target auc-
tion. We show that even without recovering the information structure from the data,
an analyst can perform robust counterfactual analysis and answer the following ques-
tion: under an arbitrary information structure in the current auction which produced
the data at hand, what is the best and worst value of a given quality measure (e.g.
welfare, revenue) in the new target auction under an arbitrary information structure?
Thus we can get estimates of the upper and lower bounds of a given quantity in the
new auction design, in a way that is robust to information structure and without the
need of recovering it. Hence, this approach to inference requires minimal informa-
tional assumptions on the data generating process (DGP) that generated the existing
data set and minimal informational assumptions on the counterfactual auction that a
market designer is contemplating to run.
The closest work to our paper is Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris 2017, where
the authors provide worst-case bounds on the revenue of a common value first price
auction as a function of the distribution of values. Their approach does not use
the bid distribution as input, unlike our approach which obtains an estimate of the
bid distribution from the data. The main approach in BBM is to show that the
revenue cannot be too small since at BCE, no player wants to deviate to any other
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action and so players do not want to deviate to a specific type of a deviation which
is the following: conditional on your bid, deviate uniformly at random above your
bid (upwards deviation). Hence, the bound on the mean they provide uses a subset
of the set of best response deviations that are allowed so as to bound the bid of a
player as a function of his value. In drawing a connection between the equilibrium
bid and the value, this bound is by definition loose (and can be very loose - bound
twice as large as identified set - as we show in an example in Appendix A). Given
data, we are able to learn the bid distribution and hence are not constrained to look
at only these bid-distribution-oblivious upwards deviations. We can instead compute
an optimal deviating bid for this given bid distribution and use the constraint that
the player does not want to deviate to this distribution-tailored action. This allows
us to bound the unobserved value of the player as a function of the observed bid
leading to a sharp characterization of auction fundamentals using the data. Also, the
approach taken to inference in this paper is deliberately conservative in that we try to
make weak or no assumptions on information while maintaining Nash behavior. This
is in the same spirit as Haile and Tamer [2003] who study the question of inference
in English auctions under minimal assumptions and derive estimable bounds on the
distribution of bidder valuations.
Another paper that uses a similar insight of studying the econometrics of games
with weak information is the recent work of Magnolfi and Roncoroni [2016] on inference
in entry game models. The approach used there, though similar in motivation, does
not transfer easily to studying general auction mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem and pro-
vides formal definitions of the objects of interest. We then state our identification
results given an i.i.d. set of data on bids. This identification is constructed via a
linear program where we show how various constraints (such as symmetry, parametric
restrictions, etc) can be incorporated. We also show how computing sharp sets for
the expected value of moments of the fundamentals amounts to solving two linear
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programs and how robust counterfactual analysis of some metric function, with re-
spect to changes in the auction, can also be handled in a computationally efficient
manner. We then provide two example applications of the general setup: one for
common value auctions (Section 3) and another for private value auctions (Section
4). Section 5 provides our estimation approach for constructing confidence intervals
on the estimated quantities from sampled datasets using sub-sampling methods and
finite sample concentration inequality approaches. Section 6 examines the finite sam-
ple performance of the large linear program using a set of Monte Carlo simulations.
These show adequate performance in IPV and Common Value (CV) setups. Section
7 illustrates our inference approach using auction data from OCS wildcat oil auctions
and show how the statistical algorithm can be used to derive bounds on valuation
distributions. Finally, the Appendix contains results on the sharpness of the BBM
bounds, and bounds on the mean of the valuation in common value auctions with
different smoothness assumptions.
2 Bayes-Correlated Equilibria and Information Struc-
ture Uncertainty
We consider a game of incomplete information among n players. There is an unknown
payoff-relevant state of the world θ ∈ Θ. This state of the world enters directly in each
player’s utility. Each player i can pick from among a set of actions Ai and receives
utility which is a function of the payoff-relevant state of the world θ and the action
profile of the players a ∈ A ≡ A1 × . . . × An: ui(a; θ). This along with a prior on θ
(defined below) will represent the game structure that we denote by G, as separate
from the information structure which we will define next.
Conditional on the state of the world each player receives some minimal signal
ti ∈ Ti. The state of the world θ ∈ Θ and the vector of signals t ∈ T ≡ T1 × . . .× Tn
are drawn from some joint measure1 pi ∈ Π ⊆ ∆(Θ × T ). The signals ti’s can be
1The setup is general in that the set T is unrestricted.
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arbitrarily correlated with the state of the world. We denote such signal structure
with S. This defines the game (G,S).2
We consider a setting where prior to picking an action each player receives some
additional information in the form of an extra signal t′i ∈ T ′i . The signal vector
t′ = (t′1, . . . , t
′
n) can be arbitrarily correlated with the true state of the world and with
the original signal vector t = (t1, . . . , tn). We denote such augmenting signal structure
with S ′ and the set of all possible such augmenting signal structures with S ′. This will
define a game (G,S ′). Subsequent to observing the signals ti and t′i, the player picks
an action ai. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium or BNE in this game (G,S
′) is a mapping
σi : Ti × T ′i → ∆(Ai) from the pair of signals ti, t′i to a distribution over actions, for
each player i, such that each player maximizes his expected utility conditional on the
signals s/he received.
A fundamental result in the literature on robust predictions (see Bergemann and
Morris [2013, 2016]), is that the set of joint distributions of outcomes a ∈ A, unknown
states θ and signals t, that can arise as a BNE of incomplete information under an
arbitrary additional information structure in (G,S ′), is equivalent to the set of Bayes-
Correlated Equilibria, or BCE in (G,S). So, every BCE in (G,S) is a BNE in (G,S ′)
for some augmenting information structure S ′. We give the formal definition of BCE
next.
Definition 1 (Bayes-Correlated Equilibrium). A joint distribution ψ ∈ ∆(Θ×T ×A)
is a Bayes-correlated equilibrium of (G,S) if for each player i, signal ti, action ai and
2We will assume throughout that the set of n players is fixed and known. If in the data the set
of participating players varies across auctions and players do not necessarily know the number or
bidders, then we can consider the superset of all players and simply assign a special type to each non-
participating player. Conditional on this type, players always choose a default action (e.g. bidding
zero in an auction). Then dependent on whether players observe the number of participants before
submitting an action can be encoded by whether the players receive as part of their default signal,
whether some player’s type is the special non-participating type. In our auction applications we will
assume that players do not necessarily observe the entrants in the auction before bidding.
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deviating action a′i:
E(θ,t,a)∼ψ [ui(a; θ) | ai, ti] ≥ E(θ,t,a)∼ψ [ui(a′i, a−i; θ) | ai, ti] (1)
and such that the marginals with respect to signals and payoff states are preserved,
i.e.:
∀θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T :
∑
a∈A
ψ(θ, t, a) = pi(θ, t) (2)
An equivalent and simpler way of phrasing the Bayes-correlated equilibrium
conditions is that:
∀ti, ai, a′i :
∑
θ,t−i,a−i
ψ(θ, t, a) · (ui(a; θ)− ui(a′i, a−i; θ)) ≥ 0 (3)
We state the main result in Bergemann and Morris [2016] next.
Theorem 1 (Bergemann and Morris [2016]). A distribution ψ ∈ ∆(Θ × T × A) can
arise as the outcome of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium under some augmenting information
structure S ′ ∈ S ′, if and only if it is a Bayes-correlated equilibrium in (G,S).
The robustness property of this result is as follows. The set of BNE for (G,S ′)
(think of an auction with unknown information) is the same as the set of BCE for
(G,S) where S ′ is an augmented information structure derived from S. So, we will
not need to know what is in S ′, but rather we could compute the set of BCE for (G,S)
and the Theorem shows that for each BCE, there exists a corresponding information
structure S ′ in S ′ and a BNE of the game (G,S ′) that implements the same outcome.
2.1 The Econometric Inference Question
We consider the question of inference on auction fundamentals using data under weak
assumptions on information. In particular, assume we are given sample of observations
of action profiles a1, . . . , aN from an incomplete information game G. Assume that
we do not know the exact augmenting signal structure S1, . . . , SN that occurred in
each of these samples where it is implicitly maintained that Si can be different from
Sj for i 6= j, i.e., the signal structure in the population is drawn from some unknown
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mixture. Also, maintaining that players play Nash, or that at was the outcome of some
Bayes-Nash equilibrium or BNE under signal structure St, We study the question of
inference on the distribution pi of the fundamentals of the game. Under the maintained
assumption, we characterize the sharp set of possible distributions of fundamentals pi
that could have generated the data. This allows for policy analysis within the model
without making strong restrictions on information.
A similar question was recently analyzed in the context of entry games by Magnolfi
and Roncoroni [2016], where the goal was the identification of the single parameter
of interaction when both players choose to enter a market. In this work we ask this
question in an auction setting and attempt to identify the distribution of the unknown
valuations non-parametrically.
The key question for our approach is to allow for observations on different auctions
to use different (and unobserved to the econometrician) information structures, and,
given the information structures, that different markets or observations on auctions, to
use a different BNE. Given this equivalence of the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria under
some information structure and the set of Bayes-correlated equilibria, and given that
the set of BCE is convex, allowing for this kind of heterogeneity is possible. Heuris-
tically, given a distribution over action profiles φ ∈ ∆(A) (which is constructed using
the data), there exists a mixture of information structures and equilibria under which
φ was the outcome. The process by which we arrived at φ is by first picking an infor-
mation structure from this mixture and then selecting one of the Bayes-Nash equilibria
for this information structure. This is possible if and only if there exists a distribution
ψ(θ, t, a), that is a Bayes-correlated equilibrium and such that
∑
θ,t ψ(θ, t, a) = φ(a)
for all a ∈ A. Again, we start with the elementary information structure S and main-
tain that observations in the data are expansions of this information structure. So, for
a given market i, any BNE using information structure Si is a BCE under S. The data
distribution of action is a mixture of such BNE over various information structures
and hence it would map into a mixture of BCE under the same S. Since the set of
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BCE under S is convex, any mixtures of elements in the set is also a BCE. So then
intuitively, the set of primitives that are consistent with the model and the data is the
set of BCEs, ψ(θ, t, a) such that
∑
θ,t ψ(θ, t, a) = φ(a) for all a ∈ A.
To conclude, the convexity of the set of BCEs allows us to relate a distribution of bids
from an iid sample to a mixture of BCEs. This is possible since the distribution of
bids uses a mixture of signal structures, which essentially coincides with a mixture of
BCEs, itself another BCE by convexity. We summarize this discussion with a formal
result.
Lemma 2. Consider a model which conditional on the unobservables, yields a convex
set of possible predictions on the observables. Then the sharp identified set of the
unobservables under the assumption that exactly one of these predictions is selected
in our dataset, is identical to the sharp identified set under the assumption that our
dataset is a mixture of selections from these predictions.
Proof. Suppose that what we observe in the data is a convex combination of feasible
predictions of our model. Then by convexity of the prediction set, this convex com-
bination is yet another feasible prediction of our model. Hence, this is equivalent to
the assumption that this single prediction is selected in our dataset.
Finally, we provide next the main engine that allows for construction of the ob-
servationally equivalent set of primitives that obey model assumptions and result in
a distribution on the observables that match that with the data. We state this as a
Result.
Result 3. Let there be a distribution φ defined on the space of action profiles. Given
the setup and results above, the set of feasible joint distributions of signals and types
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pi that are consistent with φ are the set of distributions for which the following linear
program is feasible:
LP (φ, pi) ∀ti, ai, a′i :
∑
θ,t−i,a−i
φ(a) · x(θ, t|a) · (ui(a; θ)− ui(a′i, a−i; θ)) ≥ 0 (4)
∀(θ, t) : pi(θ, t) =
∑
a∈A
φ(a) · x(θ, t|a) (5)
x(·, ·|α) ∈ ∆(Θ× T ) (6)
where
∑
θ,t ψ(θ, t, α) = φ(α) for all α ∈ A, and ψ(θ, t, α) = φ(α)x(θ, t|α).
Equivalently, the sharp set for the distribution pi ∈ ∆(Θ× T ):
ΠI(φ) = {pi ∈ Π : LP (φ, pi) is feasible }
The above result is generic, in that it handles general games with generic states of
the world θ. In particular, it nests both standard private and common value auction
models and provides a mapping between the distribution of bids φ and the set of
feasible distribtions over signals and θ. An iid assumption on bids along with a large
sample assumption allow us to learn the function φ(.) (asymptotically). So, given the
data, we can consistently estimate φ. This is a maintained assumption that we require
throughout. Given φ, the above result tells us how to map the estimate of φ to the set
of BNE that are consistent with the data and are robust to any information structure
that is an expansion of a minimal information structure S. Suppose we assume that
both t and θ take finitely many values (an assumption we maintain throughout), then
a joint distribution on (t, θ), pi(t, θ) is consistent with the model and the data if and
only if it solves the above linear program. The LP formulation is general, but in
particular applications, it is possible to use parametric distributions for the pi. In
addition, it is possible for the above LP to allow for observed heterogeneity by using
covariate information whereby this LP can be solved accordingly (see an example such
adaptation in the common value Section 3). Though the above LP holds in general
(and covers both common and private values for example), we specialize in the next
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Sections the above LP to standard cases studied in the auction literature, mainly
common values an private values models.
2.2 Identified Sets of Moments of Fundamentals
In the case of non-parametric inference where we put no constraint on the distribution
of fundamentals, i.e. Π = ∆(Θ×T ), observe that the sharp set is linear in the density
function of the fundamentals pi(·, ·). Therefore, maximizing or minimizing any linear
function of this density can be performed via solving a single linear program. This
implies that we can evaluate the upper and lower bounds of the expected value of
any function f(θ, t) of these fundamentals, in expectation over the true underlying
distribution. The latter holds, since the expectation of any function with respect to
the underlying distribution is a linear function of the density. We state this as a
corollary next.
Corollary 4. Let Result (3) hold. Also, let f(., .) be any function of the state of
the world and the profile of minimal signals (eg, f(θ, t) = θ or f(θ, t) = θ2, ...).
The sharp identified set for the expected value of f(., .) w.r.t. the true distribution of
fundamentals, i.e. E(θ,t)∼pi[f(θ, t)] is an interval [L,U ] such that:
L = min
pi∈ΠI(φ)
∑
θ∈Θ,t∈T
f(θ, t) · pi(θ, t) (7)
U = max
pi∈ΠI(φ)
∑
θ∈Θ,t∈T
f(θ, t) · pi(θ, t) (8)
Without further assumptions on Π, i.e., when Π = ∆(Θ, T ), these are two linear
programming problems.
2.3 Robust Counterfactual Analysis
Suppose that we wanted to understand the performance of some other auction when
deployed in the same market, with respect to some objective or metric: F : Θ×T×A→
R that is a function of the unknown fundamentals and the action vector. Examples of
such metrics in single-item auctions could be social welfare: F (θ, t, a) =
∑n
i=1 θixi(a)
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or revenue, i.e. F (θ, t, a) =
∑n
i=1 pi(a), where θi is the value of player i for the item at
sale, xi(a) is the probability of allocating to player i under action profile a and p(a)
is the expected payment of player i under action profile a.
We are interested in computing an upper and lower bound on this metric under
this new auction which has different utilities u˜i(a; θ) and under any Bayes-correlated
equilibrium which would map into a BNE with an augmenting information structures.
This is important since it allows us to obtain bounds on welfare or other metrics in
a new environment . The welfare bounds computed in this manner will inherit the
robustness property in that they will be valid under all information structures.
This is straightforward in our setup since computing a sharp identified set for any
such counter-factual can be done in a computationally efficient manner, in both the
common value setting and in the correlated private value setting. The upper bound
of the counter-factual can be obtained using the following linear program, that takes
as input the observed distribution of bids in our current auction, the metric F , and
the primitive utility form u˜ = (u˜1, . . . , u˜n) under the alternative auction. We state
this result in the next Theorem.
Theorem 5. Given a metric function F : Θ×B → R, a distribution over action pro-
files φ() and vector of alternative auction utilities u˜, the sharp upper and lower bounds
on the expected metric under the new auction can be computed using the following LP:
LP (φ, F, u˜) min /max
ψ˜
∑
θ,t,a
F (θ, t, a) · ψ˜(θ, t, a)
∀ti, ai, a′i :
∑
θ,t−i,a−i
ψ˜(θ, t, a) · (u˜i(a; θ)− u˜i(a′i, a−i; θ)) ≥ 0
∀(θ, t) ∈ Θ× T : pi(θ, t) =
∑
a∈A
ψ˜(θ, t, a)
ψ˜ ∈ ∆(Θ× T × A) and pi ∈ ΠI(φ)
In the non-parametric case, where Π = ∆(Θ× T ), the latter is a linear program.
Note that getting sharp bounds on welfare measures for example using the above
Theorem does not require one to infer in a prior step the distribution over the prim-
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itives. Rather, the above procedure provides sharp bounds on this welfare measure
using a linear program.
3 Common Value Auctions
We specialize the above results to important classes of auctions. We begin with the
common value model in which the game of incomplete information G is a single item
common value auction. In this case the unknown state of the world is the unknown
common value of the object v, which we assume to take values in some finite set V .
Moreover, we initially assume that the minimal information structure is degenerate,
i.e., players receive no minimal signal about this unknown common value3. The signal
set T becomes a singleton and is irrelevant. Thus we will denote with pi ∈ ∆(V )
the distribution of the unknown common value, which is the parameter that we wish
to identify. This is a particularly simple model to illustrate the structure of the LP
approach and showcase the flexibility of our methods. So, in this particular model, we
want to learn the distribution of the state of the world which is the common valuation
distribution.
Prior to bidding in the auction, the players receive some signal which is drawn from
some distribution; this signal can be correlated with the unknown common value and
with the signals of his opponents. We wish to be ignorant about which information
structure realized in each auction sample and want to identify the sharp identified set
for pi. Moreover, we will assume that the players’ bids take values in some discrete
set B and players play a BNE. The characterization of the identified set for pi in this
model is stated in the Theorem below.
Theorem 6. Let the common value model above hold with n bidders. Given a dis-
tribution of bid profiles φ supported on a set S ⊆ Bn, the set of distributions of bids
3Other constraints on the initial signals are allowed and here we take the degenerate signal for
simplicity.
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pi ∈ ∆(V ) that are consistent with φ are ones where the following program is feasible:
LP (φ, pi) ∀b∗i , b′i ∈ B :
∑
v∈V, b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b) · x(v|b) · (ui(b; v)− ui(b′i,b−i; v)) ≥ 0
∀v ∈ V : pi(v) =
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · x(v|b)
∀b ∈ S : x(·|b) ∈ ∆(V )
Observe, that in this setting, the latter linear program is also linear in pi. Thus we
get that the sharp identified set is a convex set and is defined as the set of solutions
to the above linear program, where pi is also a variable.
This observation also allows us to easily infer upper and lower bounds on any
linear function of the unknown distribution pi. This is stated next as a Corollary to
the above Theorem.
Corollary 7. Let Result (6) hold. Also, let f(.) be any function of valuations (such
as f(v) = v or f(v) = v2, ...). Then, using the LP above, we can get upper and lower
bounds on such moments as follows:
max
pi∈ΠI(φ)
∑
v∈V
f(v) · pi(v) (9)
min
pi∈ΠI(φ)
∑
v∈V
f(v) · pi(v) (10)
Observe that the latter linear expressions are simply: Ev∼pi[f(v)] and so the above
shows that we can compute in polynomial time upper and lower bounds of any moment
of the unknown distribution of the common value.
Also, note that the Corollary above shows that to do set inference with respect to
any moment of the unknown distribution, we do not need to discretize the space of
probability distributions and enumerate over all probability vectors, checking whether
they are inside the sharp identified set. Rather we can just solve the above LP.
Essentially this observation says that we can easily compute the support function
h(z; ΠI(φ)) of the identified set ΠI(φ) at any direction z, by simply solving a linear
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program. In Section (A.2), we provide an upper bound on the mean valuation dis-
tribution when the latter is continuous. This upper bound is derived in terms of the
observed bids distribution.
Remark 1 (Winning bid). The above procedure can be easily modified if indeed as
it may be the case, only winning bids are observed. In particular, given that I observe
the CDF F (.) of the winning bid, I know that an equilibrium is consistent with said
CDF if and only if for every possible bid in B,
F (x) =
∑
v∈V
∑
b/bi≤x ∀i
ψ(v,b)
This has up to B linear constraints of Bn+1 variables, but if we assume the bid vector
distribution has small support of size K, we only need K ·B variables.
Remark 2 (Covariate Heterogeneity). Suppose we have covariates and want to
allow for observed heterogeneity where we maintain the assumption that the vector of
covariates x takes finitely many values. Then, one nonparametric approach is to repeat
and solve the above LP for pi(v|x = x0) for every value x0 that x takes. In addition,
in cases where we have E[v|x] = x′β, then we can solve directly for the identified set
for β by solving the following LP, which we denote with LP (φ, β):
∀b∗i , b′i ∈ B, x0 ∈ X :
∑
v∈V, b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b|x0) · x(v|b, x0) · (ui(b; v)− ui(b′i,b−i; v)) ≥ 0
∀x0 ∈ X : x′0β =
∑
b∈S
∑
v
vφ(b|x0) · x(v|b, x0)
∀b ∈ S, x0 ∈ X : x(·|b, x0) ∈ ∆(V )
Here, the n × k vector x′0β allows for different players to have different β’s (and
the x’s in this case would be auction specific heterogeneity where the different β’s
would allow the mean valuation of different players to depend differently on auction
characteristics).
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The latter is attractive as it allows us to couple the identified set of the mean of the
unknown common value across multiple covariate realizations, in a computationally
tractable manner. Otherwise we would have to generate the identified sets of the mean
for each covariate realization and then solve a second stage problem which would try
to find the set of joint solutions in each of these identified sets (via some form of
joint grid search) that are consistent with a model of how the conditional mean E[v|x]
varies as a function of x. However, joint grid search would grow exponentially with the
number of realizations of the covariates. The latter remark, shows that when the model
of E[v|x] is linear, then we can save this exponential blow-up in the computation whilst
leveraging the statistical power of coupling data from separate covariate realizations.
4 Private Value Auctions
We now consider the case of a private value single item auction. In this case the
(unknown) state of the world is the a vector of private values v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V n.
We assume that these private values come from some unknown joint distribution
pi ∈ ∆(V n). Moreover, we initially assume that players know at least their own
private value. Thus the (minimal) signal set Ti is equal to V and moreover, we have
that conditional on a value vector v, ti = vi, deterministically. Since the signal is a
deterministic function of the unknown state of the world, we will again denote with
pi ∈ ∆(V n) the distribution of the unknown valuation vector, which is the parameter
that we wish to identify. Here, each player first draws a valuation (as an element of
the state of the world), and then each player’s own valuation is revealed to the player
through a signal. After that, a signal is further revealed before players play a BNE
given this signal.
In this setting the sharp identified set is again slightly simplified. The result is
stated in the next Theorem.
Theorem 8. Let the above private values auction model hold. Given a distribution of
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bid profiles φ supported on a set S ⊆ Bn, the set of distributions of bids pi ∈ ∆(V n)
that are consistent with φ are the ones where the following linear program, denoted
LP (φ, b), is feasible:
∀v∗i ∈ V, b∗i , b′i ∈ B :
∑
v:vi=v∗i ,b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b) · x(v|b) · (ui(b; vi)− ui(b′i,b−i; vi)) ≥ 0
∀v ∈ V n : pi(v) =
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · x(v|b)
∀b ∈ S : x(·|b) ∈ ∆(V n)
Observe, that in this setting, the latter linear program is also linear in pi. Thus we
get that the sharp identified set is a convex set and is defined as the set of solutions to
the above linear program, where pi is also a variable. Note also here that no assumption
is made on the correlation between player valuation. This result allows for the recovery
of valuation distribution with arbitrary correlation (and general signaling structures).
As a special case of the above, we study next the IPV model of auctions.
Independent Private Values. The situation becomes more complex if we also
want to impose an extra assumption that the distribution of private values is indepen-
dent. In that case, we have the extra condition that pi must be a product distribution
which is a non-convex constraint. For instance, if we want to assume that the value
of each player is independently drawn from the same distribution ρ, and hence ρ is
what we wish to identify, then we also have the extra constraint that:
∀v ∈ V n : pi(v) = ρ(v1) · . . . · ρ(vn) (11)
Adding this constraint into the above LP, makes the LP non-convex with respect to
the variables ρ(v) (even though checking whether a given ρ is in the identified set, is
still an LP). Thus in this case we cannot compute in polynomial time upper and lower
bounds on the moments of the distribution ρ using the above LP.
However, we make the following observation which simplifies the constraints of the
LP: we note that conditional on a player’s valuation and on a bid profile b, the effect
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of a deviation ui(b; vi)− ui(b′i,b−i; vi) is independent of the values of opponents, in a
private value setting. Thus we can re-write the best response constraint as:∑
b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b) · xi(v∗i |b) · (ui(b; v∗i )− ui(b′i,b−i; v∗i )) ≥ 0 (12)
where xi(vi|b) = Pr[Vi = vi|B = b], where Vi is the random variable representing
player i’s value and B is the random variable representing the bid profile at a BCE.
Then we can formulate the consistency constraints, by simply imposing a constraint
per player, i.e. if ρi is the distribution of player i’s value, then it must be that:
ρi(vi) =
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · xi(vi|b) (13)
These are constraints that are still linear in ρi(vi). We state the LP as a corollary
next.
Corollary 9. Assume that the above IPV model hold. The following LP, denoted
LP (φ, ρ), characterizes the sharp identification under the independent private values
model:
∀i ∈ [n], vi ∈ V, b∗i , b′i ∈ B :
∑
b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b) · xi(vi|b) · (ui(b; vi)− ui(b′i,b−i; vi)) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ [n], vi ∈ V : ρi(vi) =
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · xi(vi|b)
∀b ∈ S : xi(·|b) ∈ ∆(V )
In particular if we assume that player’s are symmetric, i.e. ρi(v) = ρ(v), then we
can compute upper and lower bounds on any moment E[f(v)] of the common value
distribution:
max
xi(·|b)
∑
v∈V
f(v) · ρ(v)
∀i ∈ [n], vi ∈ V, b∗i , b′i ∈ B :
∑
b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b) · xi(vi|b) · (ui(b; vi)− ui(b′i,b−i; vi)) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ V : ρ(v) =
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · xi(v|b)
∀i ∈ [n],b ∈ S : xi(·|b) ∈ ∆(V )
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A by-product of this analysis is that the linear program allows us to test for symmetry
in the independent private values model. In particular it is not clear that when we
assume that all marginals are the same, then the LP is feasible. Thus by checking
feasibility of the LP we can refute the assumption of symmetric independent private
values.
Note here that given that we allow the augmenting signals to be arbitrary corre-
lated, we are not able to infer any information about the joint distribution of valuation,
such as correlation, given a bid profile.
4.1 Point Identification in First Price Auctions with Contin-
uous Bids
Generally in the independent private values model, if we allow the bids and valuations
to be continuous, we show here that the bidder specific valuation distributions are all
identified even allowing for general information structures. This is important since
the information here is allowed to be correlated but yet the valuation distributions ρi
of each player i (under independence) are point identified.
Denote with G−i(·|bi), the CDF of the maximum other bid at a BCE, conditional
on a bid bi of player i, and let g−i(·|bi) be the density. These are observable in the data.
Now the utility of a player from submitting a bid b′i conditional on being recommended
by BCE to player bi and observing a value of vi is:
Ui(b
′
i; vi, bi) = (vi − b′i) ·G−i(b′i|bi) (14)
Since, bi is maximizing the above quantity, by the best-response constraints, then we
get that the derivative of the utility with respect to b′i has to be equal to 0 at b
′
i = bi.
The latter implies:
(vi − bi) · g−i(bi|bi)−G−i(bi|bi) = 0 (15)
We summarize our result in the following Theorem.
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Theorem 10. Let the IPV model above hold and further assume the bid distribution
is continuous and admits a density. Thus we can write the value of a player as a
function of his bid and of the conditional maximum other bid distribution:
vi = bi +
G−i(bi|bi)
g−i(bi|bi) (16)
Hence, the valuation distribution for each player is point identified.
Hence, if we know the population bid distribution and if we assume that it is
continuous and admits a density, then given the bid of a player we can invert and
uniquely identify his value. Thus we can write the CDF of the value distribution of
each player as a function of the observables.
A similar result was shown for the first price IPV model (without signals) in Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] and later also generalized to the affiliated private values
setting by Li, Perrigne, and Vuong [2002]. Interestingly, the inversion formula that
we arrived to in the independent private values setting, but under robustness to the
information structure, is the same as the inversion formula of Li, Perrigne, and Vuong
[2002] under the correlated private value setting. It is interesting to note that under
the assumption that the bid of a player is strictly increasing in his value at any Bayes-
Correlated equilibrium, then we can re-do the analysis in this section in the more
general correlated private values setting and show that we can invert the value of a
player from the observed correlated bid distribution. The inversion formula is identical
to Equation (16) and identical to the inversion derived in Li, Perrigne, and Vuong
[2002]. This essentially shows that in terms of inference, robustness to information
structure is in some sense equivalent to robustness to correlation in values.
Finally, as in the common values case, it is possible to adjust the LP to account
for observing only the winning bids in the Private Values case.
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5 Inference on Sharp Sets in CV Auctions
In general, we do no have access to the distribution φ(b). Instead, we have access to
N i.i.d. observations ω1, ..., ωN from said distribution ; let ωt(b) = 1{ωt = b}. The
sampled distribution is then given by
φN(b) =
1
N
N∑
t=1
ωt(b) (17)
In this section, we develop techniques for estimating the sharp identified set using
samples from φ(b). We showcase our techniques for the CV setup for simplicity. Also,
we focus on inference on the identified set for pi which is the object of inference here.
Often times, we parametrize the distribution of the common values, and so inference
will be on the identified set for the vector of parameters4. We start with finite sample
approaches to constructing confidence regions for sets using concentration inequalities.
These seem to be the first application of such results on using such inequalities to
settings with partial identification5. We also show how existing set inference methods
can also be used to construct confidence regions.
5.1 Finite Sample Inference via Concentration Inequalities
We explore first the question of set inference using finite sample concentration in-
equalities. This allows us to obtain a confidence set for the identified set where the
coverage property holds for every sample size. In addition, we highlight tools from the
concentration of measure literature applied to inference on sets in partially identified
models.
As a reminder, given a probability distribution over bids φ(b), the sharp set of com-
patible equilibria φ(v,b) = φ(b)x(v|b) is the set ΘI of joint probability distributions
4It is possible to construct the CI for the unknown parameters -rather than the identified set by
inverting test statistics.
5Finite sample inference results are particularly attractive in models with partial identification
since standard asymptotic approximations are not typically uniformly valid especially in models that
are close to/or are point identified.
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satisfying:
∀b∗i , b′i ∈ B :
∑
v∈V, b∈S:bi=b∗i
φ(b) · x(v|b) · (ui(b; v)− ui(b′i,b−i; v)) ≥ 0 (18)
for the proper x(.|.). See the statement of Theorem (6) above. Let pi(.) be the vector
characterizing the distribution of the common value. Let {Fj(x; pi, φ) : j ∈M}, denote
the negative of the best-response and density constraints, associated with the BCE
LP in Theorem (6). Then in the population pi is feasible iff:
min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; pi, φ) ≤ 0 (19)
Then we have that the identified set is defined as:
ΠI = {pi : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; pi, φ) ≤ 0} (20)
Now we consider a finite sample analogue. Observe that Fj(x; pi, φ) = E[fj(x; pi, ω)],
where expectation is over the random vector ω and the function fj(·; pi, ω) takes the
form:
fj(x; pi, ω) =
∑
v∈V, b∈S:bi=b∗i
ω(b) · x(v|b) · (ui(b′i,b−i; v)− ui(b; v)) (21)
for some triplet (i, b∗i , b
′
i) for the case of best-response constraints and similarly for
density consistency constraints. Then we consider the sample analogue:
FNj (x; pi) =
1
N
N∑
t=1
fj(x; pi, ωt) (22)
Observe that due to the linearity of Fj with respect to φ, we can re-write: F
N
j (x; pi) =
Fj(x; pi, φN). One can then define the estimated identified set by analogy, i.e., replacing
φ(b) with φN(b) :
ΠNI = {pi : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; pi, φN) ≤ σN} (23)
for some decaying tolerance constant σN (which can be set to zero).
Because the pdf of a non-parametric distribution is a very high-dimensional object,
inference on it will require many samples. Hence, we will instead focus on two more
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structured inference problems. In the first one we are interested in inferring the
identified set for a moment of the distribution and in the second we make assume that
the said pdf is known up to a finite dimensional parameter and infer the identified set
of these lower dimensional parameters. One can in principle recover non-parametric
inference by simply making the parameters be the values of the pdf at the discrete
support points, albeit at a cost in the sample complexity.
5.1.1 Inference on Identified Set for Moments
We begin with the non-parametric setting and show how to construct inference on
the identified set of any moment function m : V → [−H,H] of the common value
distribution that is valid in finite samples. Observe that the identified set for any
moment m : V → [−H,H] is an interval [L,U ] defined by:
L = min
x: maxj∈M Fj(x;φ)≤0
∑
v∈V
m(v) ·
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · x(v|b)
U = max
x: maxj∈M Fj(x;φ)≤0
∑
v∈V
m(v) ·
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · x(v|b)
(24)
where x in both optimization problems is ranging over the convex set of conditional
distributions, i.e. x(·|b) ∈ ∆(V ), which we omit for simplicity of notation. We can
then define their finite sample analogues as:
LN(σN) = min
x: maxj∈M FNj (x)≤σN
∑
v∈V
m(v) ·
∑
b∈S
φN(b) · x(v|b)
UN(σN) = max
x: maxj∈M FNj (x)≤σN
∑
v∈V
m(v) ·
∑
b∈S
φN(b) · x(v|b)
(25)
Where FNj (x) and φN are given in Equations (22) and (17) respectively.
The following result gives finite sample high probability bounds on the coverage
of the interval [LN(σN)− N , UN(σN) + N ]. As a reminder, we use n to designate the
number of bidders, N is sample size, and |B| is the number of support points for bids.
Theorem 11. Suppose that ui(b; v) ∈ [−H,H] for all i ∈ [n], b ∈ Bn and v ∈ V and
let σN = 2H
√
log(4n|B|2/δ)
N
and εN = 2H
√
log(4/δ)
N
. Then:
Pr
[
[L,U ] ⊆ [LN(σN)− N , UN(σN) + N]] ≥ 1− δ (26)
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where L, U are defined by Equation (24) and LN(σN), UN(σN) are defined by Equa-
tion (25).
Proof. We will show that with probability at least 1 − δ/2: LN(σN) − N ≤ L. The
theorem follows by also showing that UN(σN) + N ≥ U with probability at least
1 − δ/2 and then using a union bound of the bad events. The second inequality,
follows along identical lines by simply replacing m(v) with −m(v). So it suffices to
show the first inequality.
We remind the reader the definitions of the two quantities:
L = min
x: maxj∈M Fj(x;φ)≤0
∑
v∈V
m(v) ·
∑
b∈S
φ(b) · x(v|b) (27)
LN(σN) = min
x: maxj∈M FNj (x)≤σN
∑
v∈V
m(v) ·
∑
b∈S
φN(b) · x(v|b) (28)
Let x∗ be the optimal solution to the population LP of Equation (27). We will argue
that w.h.p. for the choice of σN it remains a solution of the finite sample LP of
Equation (28) and the value of the finite sample LP under x∗ is at least the value of
the population LP plus N .
Observe that FNj (x
∗) is the sum of N i.i.d. random variables bounded in [−H,H]
with mean Fj(x
∗;φ). By Hoeffding’s inequality with probability 1− κ:
FNj (x
∗) ≤ Fj(x∗;φ) + 2H
√
log(1/κ)
N
≤ 2H
√
log(1/κ)
N
(29)
where the second inequality follows by feasibility of x∗ for the LP of Equation (27).
By a union bound over all j ∈M and since |M | = n|B|2 we get that with probability
at least 1− κn|B|2:
max
j∈M
Fj(x
∗;φ) ≤ 2H
√
log(1/κ)
N
(30)
For κ = δ
4n|B|2 and σ
N = 2H
√
log(4n|B|2/δ)
N
we get that with probability 1 − δ
4
:
maxj∈M FNj (x
∗) ≤ σN and thereby x∗ is feasible for the finite sample LP.
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Finally, the value of the finite sample solution can be written as
QN(x) =
1
N
N∑
t=1
q(x;ωt) (31)
with:
q(x;ωt) =
∑
v∈V
m(v)
∑
b∈S
ωt(b) · x(v|b) (32)
Thus it is also the sum of N i.i.d. random variables bounded in [−H,H],6 and with
mean Q(x;φ) =
∑
v∈V m(v) ·
∑
b∈S φ(b) · x(v|b). Hence, by Hoeffding’s inequality,
with probability at least 1− δ/4:
QNj (x
∗) ≤ Qj(x∗;φ) + 2H
√
log(4/δ)
N
= L+ N (33)
By a union bound we get that with probability at least 1−δ/2, x∗ is feasible for the
finite sample LP and achieves value QNj (x
∗) ≤ L+ N . In that case, by the definition
of LN(σN), we get: LN(σN) ≤ QNj (x∗) ≤ L+ N and the theorem follows. 7
5.1.2 Inference on Identified Set for Parametric Distributions.
For the parametric case, we assume that the distribution pi(v) is parametric of the
form pi(v, θ) for some finite parameter set Θ. In the parametric setting we need to
augment the constraint set M , apart from containing the best-response constraints,
to contain the parametric form consistency constraints:
∀v ∈ V : pi(v, θ) =
∑
v∈V
φ(b) · x(v|b) (34)
These can also be written of the form Fj(x;φ) ≤ 0 for some function Fj(x;φ) =
E[fj(x;ω)].8 We overload notation and let M be this augmented set of constraints.
6Since m(v) ∈ [−H,H] and x(·|b) ∈ ∆(V ).
7We could have used an empirical Bernstein inequality instead of Hoeffding’s inequality and and
replace the H in the quantities σN by
√
maxj VarN (FNj (x
∗)), where VarN is the empirical variance,
at the expense of adding a lower order term of O
(
H
N
)
(see e.g. Maurer and Pontil [2009], Peel et al.
[2010]). Similarly, for N . However, the latter requires knowledge of x∗ and taking a supremum over
x∗ in the latter seems to be as conservative as a Hoeffding bound.
8Simply add one constraint of the form pi(v, θ) −∑v∈V φ(b) · x(v|b) ≤ 0 and one of the form∑
v∈V φ(b) · x(v|b)− pi(v, θ) ≤ 0.
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Then the parameter of interest is θ and the identified set for θ takes the form:
ΘI = {θ ∈ Θ : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; θ, φ) ≤ 0} (35)
and its sample equivalent
ΘNI
(
σN
)
= {θ ∈ Θ : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; θ, φN) ≤ σN} (36)
for some decaying tolerance constant σN (which can be set to zero).
The next Theorem provides finite sample high probability coverage bounds for ΘI .
Theorem 12. Consider ΘI and Θ
N
I
(
σN
)
as defined in Equations (35) and (49).
Suppose that ui(b; v) ∈ [−H,H] for all i ∈ [n], b ∈ Bn and v ∈ V . If σN =
2H
√
log(|Θ|·(n|B|2+|V |)/δ)
N
, then:
Pr
[
ΘI ⊆ ΘNI
(
σN
)] ≥ 1− δ (37)
Proof. To show the statement we need to show that with probability 1 − δ, for all
θ ∈ ΘI it must be that θ ∈ ΘNI (σN). Equivalently, if minx maxj∈M Fj(x; θ, φ) ≤ 0 then
minx maxj∈M FNj (x; θ) ≤ σN . The latter follows along similar lines as in the proof of
Theorem 11. Let θ ∈ ΘI and let x∗ be the solution to the population problem. Then
by Hoeffding’s inequality and a union bound over M ,9 for the chosen σN we have that
with probability at least 1− δ|Θ| : maxj∈M FNj (x∗; θ) ≤ σN . Hence, the latter inequality
also holds for the minimum over x and thereby θ ∈ ΘNI (σN). By a union bound the
latter holds uniformly over θ with probability at least 1− δ.
Sample Variance Based Bounds. We now show how to improve upon the prior
analysis and getting tolerance variables σN whose leading 1/
√
N term does not depend
on H, but rather on the sample variance of the constraints. We will modify the finite
sample identified set ΘNI (σ
N) defined in Equation (49), as follows: instead of using a
uniform tolerance σN for all the constraints, we will define tolerance for each constraint
9Now M also contains the density consistency constraints and thereby |M | = n|B|2 + |V |.
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differently based on its sample variance:
ΘˆNI (λ, σ
N) =
{
θ : min
x
max
j∈M
(
FNj (x; θ)− λ
√
VarN(fj(x; θ, ω))
N
)
≤ σN
}
(38)
Where VarN(X) for a random variable X, denotes the sample variance:
VarN(X) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
1≤t<t′≤n
(Xt −X ′t)2.
The extra variance modification, which is reminiscent of sample variance penalization
in empirical risk minimization [Maurer and Pontil, 2009] and optimism in bandit
algorithms [Audibert et al., 2009] , will allow us to set σN to be of order O(H/N)
rather than O(H/
√
N).
Theorem 13. Consider ΘI and Θˆ
N
I
(
λ, σN
)
as defined in Equations (48) and (38).
Suppose that ui(b; v) ∈ [−H,H] for all i ∈ [n], b ∈ Bn and v ∈ V . If λ =√
2 log(2|Θ||M |/δ) and σN = 14H log(2|Θ||M |/δ)
3(N−1) (with |M | = n|B|2 + |V |), then:
Pr
[
ΘI ⊆ ΘˆNI
(
λ, σN
)] ≥ 1− δ (39)
Proof. To show the statement we need to show that with probability 1 − δ, for all
θ ∈ ΘI it must be that θ ∈ ΘˆNI (λ, σN). Let θ ∈ ΘI and let x∗ be the solution to the
population problem, i.e. x∗ ∈ arg minx maxi∈M Fi(x; θ, φ).
By the empirical Bernstein bound (Theorem 4 of Maurer and Pontil [2009]), we
have that with probability at least 1− κ:
FNj (x
∗; θ) ≤ Fj(x∗; θ, φ) +
√
2VarN(fj(x∗; θ, ω)) log(2/κ)
N
+
14H log(2/κ)
3(N − 1) (40)
Since x∗ is feasible Fj(x∗; θ, φ) ≤ 0 and thereby with probability 1− κ:
FNj (x
∗; θ)−
√
2VarN(fj(x∗; θ, ω)) log(2/κ)
N
≤ 14H log(2/κ)
3(N − 1) (41)
Hence, also:
FNj (x
∗; θ)−
√
2VarN(fj(x∗; θ, ω)) log(2/κ)
N
≤ 14H log(2/κ)
3(N − 1) (42)
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By the union bound the latter happens for all j ∈ M with probability 1 − κ|M |.
Thus setting κ = δ|Θ||M | , we have that with probability 1− δ|Θ| :
max
j∈M
FNj (x
∗; θ)−
√
2VarN(fj(x∗; θ, ω)) log(2|Θ||M |/δ)
N
≤ 14H log(2|Θ||M |/δ)
3(N − 1) (43)
The latter then also holds for the minimum over x of the LHS:
min
x
max
j∈M
FNj (x; θ)−
√
2VarN(fj(x; θ, ω)) log(2|Θ||M |/δ)
N
≤ 14H log(2|Θ||M |/δ)
3(N − 1) (44)
Hence, θ ∈ ΘˆNI (λ, σN) for the λ and σN stated in the Theorem. The Theorem then
follows by a union bound over Θ.
The latter theorem is asymptotically an improvement over Theorem 12, when the
variances of the constraints are not as large as their worst case bound of 4H2, which
is essentially what is assumed in Theorem 12. However, one drawback of this theorem
is that the new estimated set ΘˆNI (λ, σ
N) requires solving more than linear programs.
In particular for every parameter θ ∈ Θ we need to solve an optimization problem of
the form:
min
x
max
j
〈αj, x〉 − κj
√√√√∑
b,b′∈S
γb,b′
(∑
v
(xvbβjvb − xvb′βjvb′)
)2 (45)
The negative part is a concave function of x, as it can be thought of as a norm
of a vector that is a linear function of x. Thus this is a non-convex minimization
problem. Thus even though it offers a statistical improvement, it is at the expense of
computational efficiency.
5.2 Alternative Set Inference Approaches
Here, we use existing set inference approaches and adapt them to the problem at
hand. The first approach exploits the mapping between the reduced form parameter
(the distribution of bids) and the identified set via the linear program, and the second
uses subsampling approaches to set inference.
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5.2.1 Inference via the Bayesian Bootstrap
In this section, we describe approaches to inference on the identified set via a Bayesian
Bootstrap for both parametric and nonparametric models. We start with the nonpara-
metric case. As a reminder, the identified set in this nonparametric case is
ΠI = {pi : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; pi, φ) ≤ 0} (46)
This is a case of a separable problem where knowing φ∗ = {φ∗(b1), . . . , φ∗(bB)} we can
solve for the identified set via the mapping:
Π(φ) = {pi : min
x
max
i∈M
Fi(x; pi, φ
∗) ≤ σN} (47)
for some decaying tolerance constant σN (which can be set to zero). Inference on
parameter sets in separable models is analyzed in (Kline and Tamer [2016]) where
(posterior) probability statements related to the identified set10 can be computed
using the mapping between the reduced form parameters, φ(b) in this case, and the
structural parameters pi. Intuitively, for every draw s from the posterior for φ (this
is a multinomial distribution and so obtaining draws from the multinomial is simple
using the Bayesian bootstrap11) we can solve via (47) for a “copy” of the implied
identified set ΠsN by solving the LP above. Using this procedure, we can get a sequence
{ΠsN}Ss=1 that we can use to answer probability statements about the identified set ΠI .
The computational constraint in this nonparametric problem is that the parameter of
interest pi is a vector of probabilities with |V | support points. So, the bigger |V | is the
larger the number of parameters the more difficult it is to solve for the identified set via
(23) above. Hence, with the finite support condition on the bids standard (Bayesian)
10Examples of such statements are: the probability that the identified set belongs to a particular
set (e.g, when ΘI is an interval, the probability that this interval lies in [a, b]) or the probability that
a particular vector belongs to the identified set, etc.
11For example, under a limiting uninformative Dirichlet prior for φ(b), the posterior for this φ(b)
approaches the Dirichlet posterior Dir(n1, . . . , nB) where nj =
∑N
i=1 1[bi = bj ]. Therefore, using
results that connect the Gamma and Dirichlet distributions, a draw from given posterior can be
approximated by a weighted Bootstrap with Gamma weights. See also Chamberlain and Imbens
[2003].
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inference on φ(b) can be easily mapped into inference on the set ΠI . The exact
same bootstrap procedure can be used to provide (posterior) probability statement on
identified intervals [L,U ] that are defined through the mapping in (25) above. This is
relevant if one is interested in linear functional of the distribution. Inference on such
objects reduces the computational burden substantively.
In the parametric case, we assume that the distribution function of v belongs to a
parametric class that is known up to a finite dimensional parameter θ and so the LP
in Theorem 6 is modified by setting pi(v) = pi(v, θ). Then the parameter of interest is
θ and the identified set for θ takes the form:
ΘI = {θ : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; θ, φ) ≤ 0} (48)
and so the separable mapping between φ∗ and θ takes the form again of
ΘI
(
φ∗;σN
)
= {θ : min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; θ, φ
∗) ≤ σN} (49)
for some decaying tolerance constant σN (which can be set to zero).
Here again, we can use the approach in (Kline and Tamer [2016]) to answer prob-
ability statements on ΘI . The computational step here is much easier than the non-
parametric case as now solving for the identified set for every draw from the posterior
for φ is a lower dimensional problem. The Bayesian bootstrap is used to draw vectors
of bid probabilities from the multinomial distribution for bids.
In addition to this Bayesian bootstrap approach, we also provide methods based
on subsampling next.
5.2.2 Parametric Case via Subsampling
Subsampling methods can be used to conduct inference on the identified set in a
large sample framework. In particular, let θ be the parameter of interest. Again, our
problem is isomorphic to one where the objective function Q(θ) is as follows:
Q(θ) = min
x
max
j∈M
Fj(x; θ) (50)
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with a the corresponding sample analogue
QN(θ) = min
x
max
j∈M
FNj (x; θ) (51)
We first re-state the above random variable as a minimax problem over convex
and compact sets. Let p ∈ ∆M lie on the simplex on M constraints. Then QN(θ) is
equivalently defined as:
QN(θ) = min
x
sup
p
∑
j∈M
pjF
N
j (x; θ) (52)
and
Q∗(θ) = min
x
sup
p
∑
j∈M
pjFj(x; θ) (53)
where Q∗ is zero for all feasible θ′s. In addition, following the approach in Cher-
nozhukov, Hong, and Tamer [2007], we get a confidence region for the identified set
ΘI = {θ : Q∗(θ) ≤ 0} by studying the asymptotic distribution12 of
CN = sup
θ∈ΘI
min
x
sup
p
∑
j∈M
pjF
N
j (x; θ)
Let τN(1− α) be the (1− α)−quantile of C where C is the nondegenerate limit of√
NCN . Then, define the CN(1− α) as follows
CN(1− α) = {θ : QN(θ) ≤ τ+N (1− α)}
where τ+N (1− α) = max(τN(1− α), 0). Notice here that the event ΘI ⊆ CN(1− α) is
equivalent to the event CN ≤ τ+N (1− α). The next Theorem states the result.
Theorem 14. Assume that N increases to infinity, and
√
N(CN) converges in distri-
bution to C, a nondegenerate random variable. Then the set CN(1− α) defined above
has the following coverage property:
lim
N→∞
Pr [ΘI ⊆ CN(1− α)] = 1− α.
12Alternatively, we can define the objective function Q˜N (θ) = [QN (θ)]+ which is the positive
part of QN (θ). The identified set now is the minimizer of Q˜N (θ) and then similar approaches to
Chernozhukov et al. [2007] can be used to construct a CI based on subsampling.
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The asympotic distribution C above can be characterized using for example
results from Shapiro [2009] and sufficient conditions for nondegeneracy are given there
which requires second moments to hold (these hold in our case trivially since we
maintain the assumptions that bids take finitely many values).
Finally, to be able to feasibly implement the above approach, one needs to get
a value for the cutoff τN(1 − α). It is clear here that the standard nonparametric
bootstrap may not work. Even if the asymptotic distribution is normal13, we may
not be able to estimate its variance because it depends on the number of binding
constraints. Given the nondegeneracy of the limit, one approach is to use subsampling
to compute the cutoff. This can be accomplished by getting m subsamples of the data
such that m/N → 0 as N → ∞. For every subsample, we compute CmN using a
preliminary estimate Θ̂I and using the sequence {CmN }Mm=1 to get its upper (1 − α)
quantile. This will result in an estimate of CN(1 − α). We can then use that as our
new Θ̂I and iterate one or two times. This approach was implemented in the Monte
Carlo section below and in the empirical application and it provided adequate results.
6 Monte-Carlo Analysis: Common Value Auctions
In this section, we examine the techniques of Section 5 to obtain an estimated set
on simulated data. We assume in all the simulations that the values and bids are
taken from discrete sets, respectively V and B. In the whole section, we fix the
following parameters: i) The maximum value/bid H is given by H = 20. ii) The
set of possible bids is given by B = {0, . . . , H}. The set of possible common values
is V = B = {0, . . . , H}. We generate equilibrium observations as follows: First, we
generate a density f(v) of valuations with support V . We consider the four following
densities:
13The distribution of C is likely to be the supremum of a Gaussian process since the optimal value
of the LP is generally not unique.
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Normal density. fn(.) is the density of a normal random variable with mean pa-
rameters µ = 4 and standard deviation parameter σ = 1, discretized and truncated
to have support V , i.e.
fn(v) =
exp(−(v − µ)2/σ2)∑
w∈V
exp(−(w − µ)2/σ2) (54)
Poisson density. fp(.) is the density of a Poisson distribution with parameters
λ = 4, truncated inside V , i.e.:
fp(v) =
λv exp(−λ)/v!∑
w∈V
λw exp(−λ)/w! (55)
Binomial density. fb(.) is the density of a binomial random variable with proba-
bility p = 0.2 and number of draws n = H = 20, i.e.:
fb(v) =
(
N
v
)
pv(1− p)H−v (56)
Geometric density. fg(.) is the density of a geometric random variable with prob-
ability p = 0.2 truncated to have support V , i.e.:
fg(v) =
p(1− p)v∑
w∈V
p(1− p)w (57)
For each of those densities, we then generate one distribution of equilibrium bids φ,
through solving the BCE linear program for the given distribution of values and with
variables φ(b) rather than pi(v). We then generate N samples of bid vectors from φ,
to generate the observed empirical bid distribution φN .
In the non-parametric setting, since we cannot directly formulate the estimated
set of the variance (as it cannot be written as E[m(v)] for some m), we obtain
a superset for the identified set as follows: First obtain upper and lower bounds
Emin, Emax, E
2nd
min, E
2nd
max for the first and second moments respectively. Then set the
bounds on the standard deviation by the conservative ones: E2ndmin − E2max ≤ V ar ≤
E2ndmax − E2min. A computationally more tedious procedure of estimating the identified
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set for the variance is to first get the identified set for the (discrete) distribution of V
and then using that we can “solve” for a bound on the variance14.
In the parametric case, bounds on the variance can be obtained directly from
recovering bounds on the possible parameters for the distribution we consider, and
tight bounds on the parameters imply tight bounds on the second and higher order
moments. All simulations in the parametric case are therefore presented in terms of
identified and estimated sets on the parameters of the distribution of values.
6.1 Parametric vs. Non-Parametric Identified Sets
In this section, we compare the identified sets when we use and do not use parametric
knowledge of the distribution of v. Figure 1 uses the true distribution φ and shows:
• The set of (mean, standard deviation) pairs that belong to the identified set
when solving the linear program with parametric constraints, in brown.
• The set of (mean, standard deviation) pairs that belong to the identified set
when solving the original LP without parametric constraints, in green.
We do so for the four different distributions of the common value (Gaussian, Pois-
son, binomial and geometric) mentioned above. We remark that the non-parametric
linear programs seems to recover the mean of the common value accurately in all
cases. However, the bounds obtained on the second moment/standard deviation of
the distribution of common values are far from being tight.
Figure 2 compares the identified set for the true distribution to the estimated set
using Hoeffding with δ = 0.10, as described in Section 5.1 for the Gaussian density
function, for a number of samples N ∈ {103, 104, 105, 106}. We see that as N grows
larger, the estimated set grows smaller and smaller and closer to the true identified
set.
14For example, for every “draw” from the identified set for the distribution of V , we can obtain a
variance. We can repeat the process to build the identified set for the variances.
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(a) Gaussian density (b) Poisson density
(c) binomial density (d) geometric density
Figure 1: Plots of the non-parametric and parametric identified sets in the (mean,
standard deviation) space
6.2 Parametric Identified Sets
In this section, we characterize the identified and estimated sets in the parametric
case for the four distributions described above. For the Gaussian distribution, we
provide figures of the identified parameters in the (µ, σ) space. For the other, 1-
dimensional parameter distributions, we provide intervals for the parameter of the
chosen distribution. We consider two different techniques to determine the estimated
set:
• Using tolerances determined by Hoeffding’s inequality, given in Section 5.1.2
• Using quantiles of the tolerance via subsampling, as discussed in Section 5.2.2
In all figures, the brown region is the true identified set while the union of the brown
and the green region is the estimated set. Figure 3 plots the identified and estimated
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(a) N = 1000 (b) N = 10000
(c) N = 100000 (d) N = 1000000
Figure 2: Plots of the parametric identified sets and the non-parametric estimated set
through Hoeffding with δ = 0.10 in the (mean, standard deviation) space
set when using a Gaussian distribution for the common value and tolerances deter-
mined through Hoeffding with 90 percent confidence (δ = 0.10), for the number of
samples N ∈ {103, 104, 105, 106}. We remark that the number of samples needs be
large (of the order of at least 105) for Hoeffding to perform well.
Figure 4 plots the identified and estimated set when using a Gaussian distribution
for the common value and tolerances determined through subsampling and quantile
estimation for the 90, 95 and 99 percent quantiles, as seen in Section 5.2.2; we only use
N = 100 samples for the bid distribution in the three figures and k = 50 subsamples
of size s = N/4 = 25. We note that the quantile estimation technique covers the true
identified set fairly sharply even though N is only equal to 100 and hence should be
preferred to Hoeffding when small amounts of data are available.
Figure 5 gives the true identified interval for the parameters of the Poisson, bi-
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(a) N = 1000 (b) N = 10000 (c) N = 100000 (d) N = 1000000
Figure 3: Plots of the parametric identified sets and the parametric estimated set
through Hoeffding with δ = 0.10 in the (µ, σ) space
(a) 0.90 quantile (b) 0.95 quantile (c) 0.99 quantile
Figure 4: Plots of the parametric identified sets and the parametric estimated set
through the quantile method in the (µ, σ) space for N = 100
nomial and geometric distributions and the estimated interval using subsampling for
quantile estimation, for the 90, 95 and 99 percent quantiles – see 5.2.2 – for a bid
distribution sampled with N = 100. We see that for the binomial distribution, the
estimated set is very close to the true identified set. While the recovered sets for the
Poisson distribution are not as sharp as the recovered sets for the binomial distri-
bution, they still restrict the space of possible parameters in a reasonable way: the
recovered interval is [1.5, 6.5] while the space of possible parameters is [0, 20]. How-
ever, the recovered sets for the geometric distribution contains more than half of the
possible parameters, which is unsatisfying. A reason for this comes from the fact that
the geometric distribution has a much higher variance than a Poisson or binomial with
comparable means, hence there is a lot of variability across different subsamples that
can lead to large tolerances.
Using N = 500 samples and k = 50 subsamples of size s = N/4 = 125, we
obtain Figure 6. We can see that the estimated sets for the binomial and geometric
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Distribution True identified set 0.90 quantile set 0.95 quantile set 0.99 quantile set
Binomial [0.19,0.22] [0.17,0.25] [0.16,0.25] [0.15,0.27]
Poisson [4.0,4.5] [1.5,6.5] [1.5,6.5] [1.5,6.5]
Geometric [0.17,0.22] [0.06,0.56] [0.04,0.66] [0.02,0.70]
Figure 5: Identified and estimated sets of the parameters of the distributions (N=100).
Distribution True identified set 0.90 quantile set 0.95 quantile set 0.99 quantile set
Binomial [0.19,0.22] [0.18,0.24] [0.17,0.25] [0.17,0.25]
Poisson [4.0,4.5] [3.5,5.0] [3.0,5.5] [2.5,5.5]
Geometric [0.17,0.22] [0.16,0.25] [0.15,0.28] [0.14,0.29]
Figure 6: Identified and estimated sets of the parameters of the distributions (N=500).
distributions are now significantly tighter.
Finally, Figure 7 plots the identified and estimated set when using a Gaussian
distribution for the common value and tolerances determined through subsampling
and quantile estimation for the 90, 95 and 99 percent quantiles, as Figure 7. However,
we now use N = 500 samples for the bid distribution in the three figures and k = 50
subsamples of size s = N/4 = 125. We note that the estimated set now almost
coincides with the true identified set.
(a) 0.90 quantile (b) 0.95 quantile (c) 0.99 quantile
Figure 7: Plots of the parametric identified sets and the parametric estimated set
through the quantile method in the (µ, σ) space for N = 500
7 Empirical Illustration: OCS Auctions
In this section, we illustrate our framework for common value auctions on real data.
We use the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Auction Dataset that was used in the
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seminar work of Hendricks and Porter (see Hendricks and Porter [1988]). The dataset
contains bidding information on 3036 tract auctions in Louisiana and Texas. In par-
ticular, for each auction, our dataset contains the acreage of the tract and the total
bid of each participant in the auction. We assume that the bidders participate in a
first price common value auction, where the value is defined per acre; our goal is i) to
show that indeed, the bidders’ behavior in the data can be explained by a common
value auction (via the testable restriction of whether the estimated identified set is
empty), and ii) to recover the first and second order moments of the distribution of
said value. This is under weak assumptions on information in that the framework
allows bidders in different auctions to know more information about the environment.
Pre-processing of data: The dataset contains 3036 auction with varying number
of players. We consider 2-player common value auctions, hence we only keep the
entries in the dataset that contain exactly 2 bidders; there are 584 such auctions. We
model the two bidders as being the same over the 584 auctions, and assign bidders’
identities to be 1 or 2 uniformly at random in each auction. Many of the bids we have
are zero and Figure 8 plots the distribution of bids; it has mean $991.48 and standard
deviation $1825.43.
Figure 8: Distribution of bids
We assume the distribution of the common value per acre has bounded finite
support V = {0, . . . , H}. We renormalize the bids per acre to be in [0, dH
2
e] – we pick
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H/2 because the common value could have a distribution whose support goes beyond
the observed bids –, and discretize the set of bids to be {0, . . . , dH
2
e}; we do so by
rounding each renormalized bid in each auction to the closest integer. We remark that
the dataset contains a few outliers whose bid per acre is significantly higher than in
all other auctions; we therefore delete the auctions that contain bids over threshold
t = $20000. We further assume that the distribution of the common value is given by
a truncated normal distribution that takes discrete values in {0, . . . , H}, exactly as
described in the simulations of Section 6, and parametrize all optimization problems
we solve accordingly.
Results: In all figures, the value of (µ, σ) are given as the values in dollars instead of
the corresponding discretized and renormalized value, for the sake of comparison with
the $20, 000 threshold and the corresponding maximum value of $40, 000. Figure 9
plots a heat map of the estimated set as a function of the chosen tolerance in the
(µ, σ) space for two different values of H. Each color on the heat map corresponds
to a tolerance level, and the mapping from tolerance levels to colors is given by the
colorbar on the right of each figure. The color that is assigned to any given (µ, σ)
pair corresponds to the minimum level of tolerance that the analyst needs to add to
the equilibrium constraints for (µ, σ) to belong to the estimated set; therefore, the
heat map shows how the estimated set grows as the tolerance picked by the analyst
increases.
Figure 10 plots the estimated set when using the tolerance determined by the
subsampling approach of Section 5.2.2, in green using 95% level, and compares it to the
estimated set using the minimum tolerance for which the estimated set is non-empty,
in brown, for H = 400. No matter what method is used for picking the tolerance
and determining the corresponding confidence intervals, the region that is obtained
cannot be possibly smaller than the minimum tolerance set unless it is empty; in this
sense, the minimum tolerance set is the best possible set that one could hope to obtain
through any method for determining tolerances. We remark that i) the estimated set
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(a) H = 200 (b) H = 400
Figure 9: Heat map of minimum tolerance needed for (µ, σ) pairs to belong to the
estimated set
for (µ, σ) remains small relatively to the upper bound of $20, 000 on the bids and of
$40, 000 on the maximum common value, and ii) the estimated set is not much bigger
compared to the best estimated set we could hope to obtain, indicating that on top of
covering the true identified set with high probability, our techniques cannot possibly
overestimate the size of the identified by too much. We can see from the confidence
regions that the mean of the common values varies from zero 0 to around $4000 while
the standard deviation varies from close to zero to 6000. It is possible to estimate
these means as functions of covariates and hence to allow for observed heterogeneity.
(a) 0.90 quantile (b) 0.95 quantile (c) 0.99 quantile
Figure 10: Estimated sets using the 90, 95 and 99 percent quantiles, for H = 400.
The above plots the mean and variance of a normal density that is then truncated.
Since the truncated normal has a different mean and variance then the underlying nor-
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mal, we plot in Figure 11 the minimum tolerance and the estimated sets as a function
of this overall mean and standard deviation of the distribution of common values that
we identify, instead of the parameters µ, σ of the truncated normal distribution. We
obtain these plots by computing a mapping from (µ, σ) pairs to (mean, standard devi-
ation) pairs, and plot the image of Figure 10 by said mapping in the (mean, standard
deviation) space. We note that the estimated set is fairly small, indicating that our
approach identifies the first two moments of the true, underlying distribution of the
common value in an accurate fashion, despite only having access to a limited number
of samples.
(a) 0.90 quantile (b) 0.95 quantile (c) 0.99 quantile
Figure 11: Estimated sets using the 90, 95 and 99 percent quantiles, for H = 400.
8 Conclusion
We provide a framework for inference on auction fundamentals without making strong
restrictions on information. Using data, we use the recent results in theory to char-
acterize the identified set for these primitives by exploiting the linear programming
structure of the set of Bayesian correlated equilibria. We have several applications
of the approach mainly to common value and private value auctions and other sce-
narios. Our results can also be used by mechanism designers in that the data allows
us to restrict the domain of signal/state of the world distribution, which would lead
to sharper mechanisms. We also provide approaches to inference, and propose finite
sample approaches to building confidence regions for sets in partially identified models.
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A Non-sharpness of the BBM bound
We examine the upper and lower bounds on the mean from BMM. In a common value
auction an easy worst-case bound on the mean of the common value distribution
comes from the following fact: at any BCE players are getting non-zero expected
utility. Thus an obvious lower bound on mean value is the observed revenue. We can
try to show that mean value is also not much more than the revenue or some function
of the observed bids that is close to the revenue. For instance, the BBM bound shows
that:
v(q)− 1
q(n−1)/n
∫ v(q)
0
(F (x))(n−1)/ndx ≤ B(q) (58)
where q ∈ [0, 1] is a quantile, v(q) = F−1(q), F (x) is the CDF of the value distribution
and B(q) is the quantile function of the maximum bid distribution. This is equivalent
to:
1
qα
∫ q
0
αyα−1v(y)dy ≤ B(q) (59)
From this we can try to upper bound the mean of F (i.e.
∫ 1
0
v(q)dq) as a function
of the revenue, which is simply the mean of the maximum value distribution (i.e.∫ 1
0
B(q)dq). If the CDF is convex, F (0) = 0 and F (H) = 1, then F (x) ≤ x/H hence
the BBM bound gives:
v(q)
(
1− n
2n− 1
1
H(n−1)/n
(
v(q)
q
)(n−1)/n)
≤ B(q) (60)
By integrating and if we let µ be the mean of the common value and R be the observed
revenue of the auction:
µ ≤ R + n
2n− 1
1
H(n−1)/n
∫ 1
0
v(q)(2n−1)/n
q(n−1)/n
dq
This shows that there is a reasonable upper bound. For instance for the uniform
distribution, i.e. v(q) = q · H, this gives µ ≤ R + n
2n−1H
∫ 1
0
qdq = R + H n
2n−1
1
2
≤
R + H/3. Observe that if the uniform distribution is allowed in our set of possible
value distributions then we cannot hope to prove any better upper bound.
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For the case of two bidders we can now show that the BBM bound implies that
the mean of the auction must be at most:
µ ≤ R ·
(
2
√
H
R
− 1
)
(61)
where R is the observed revenue of the auction and H is the assumed upper bound on
the distribution. Thus if the revenue is at least H/α for some α, then we can conclude
that the mean must leave in the range: [R,R(2
√
α − 1)] which is a non-trivial sharp
identified set. In other words the ratio of the upper to lower bound of the sharp
identified set is at most 2
√
α− 1.
For n bidders we show (see Section A.1 below) that the BBM bound implies
that the mean of the distribution cannot be more than:
√
2n
n−1 ·R ·H or alternatively√
2n
n−1 ·R ·
(
1
n
R + L
)
if the density of values is bounded from below by 1/L. Thus if
the revenue is at least H/α, then we have that µ lies in the range: [R,R ·
√
2n
n−1α].
In fact the above bound is tight if one only uses the deviation of BBM, i.e. if all we
know is the inequality implied by these deviations, then there exists a distribution
that satisfies that inequality and which achieves the above bound.
Non-sharpness of BBM: The upper bound of BBM can be very far from the
identified set. Before we give a concrete example, we first argue why the bound from
Bergemann et al. [2017] cannot possibly be sharp: The main point of the work of BBM
was getting worst-case bounds on the revenue of a common value first price auction
as a function of the distribution of values. For that reason in the analysis, the bid
distribution is not part of the input. Their main approach is to claim that the revenue
cannot be too small. The idea behind the analysis is as follows: since something is
a BCE, no player wants to deviate to any other action. Hence, they do not want to
deviate to a specific style of a deviation which is: conditional on your bid deviate
uniformly at random above your bid (upwards deviation). Such deviation arguments
were also used in Hoy, Nekipelov, and Syrgkanis [2015], Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013]
to give bounds on the welfare of non-truthful auctions such as the first price auction.
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However, this means that the final bound given in (58) is the product of a subset of
the best-response deviation constraints. If we actually knew what the bid distribution
is in a BCE (which is the case in the econometrics task), then we wouldn’t look at only
these bid-oblivious upwards deviations. We would instead compute an optimal best-
response bid for this given bid distribution and right the constraint that the player
does not want to deviate to this tailored best-response.
We now give a concrete “extreme” example where the upper bound provided by
(58) can be as large as twice the sharp bound. In fact, in this example the mean can
be point identified, but the bound (58) gives a large interval.
Example. Consider the case of two bidders, where the observed maximum bid
distribution is a singleton i.e. {b∗}. First we argue that in this case, we can conclude
that the mean µ of the common value is equal to b∗. First, we know that the total
expected utility of the bidders must be non-negative, hence the mean of the common
value is at least the expected revenue of the auction, which is equal to b∗, i.e. µ ≥ b∗.
Now suppose that the mean was strictly larger than b∗, i.e. b∗ + . We will show
that this yields a contradiction.
First consider the case where in the support of the BCE, there exist bid vectors
of the form (b, 5) or (5, b) for b < 5. Then a player when seeing a bid of b < 5, he
wants to deviate to bidding b∗ + ζ for some ζ ∈ (0, ). The reason is that with a bid
of b he knows he is not winning and hence he is getting zero utility, while with a bid
of b∗ + ζ he knows he is deterministically winning, getting a value of µ and paying
b∗ + ζ < µ, yielding strictly positive utility. Thus it must be that the BCE contains
only one bid vector, i.e. (b∗, b∗). But under this BCE, it is obvious that the expected
value conditional on winning is µ and it is also clear that one of the two players is
winning with probability less than 1, i.e 1− δ. Thus if this player deviates to b∗ + ζ,
he wins deterministically and pays b∗ + ζ. Thus the net effect of this deviation is
µ− b∗− ζ− (1− δ)(µ− b∗) = δ · (µ−C)− ζ = δ− ζ. Taking ζ → 0, yields a deviation
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with positive net effect.
Thus we get a contradiction, and we conclude that the mean is point identified
and µ = b∗.
Now consider the bound that is derived from Equation (58) for this case of a bid
distribution. First we note that for a singleton bid distribution we have that B(q) = b∗
for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the constraint on the distribution of values implied by Equation
(59) is simplified to:
∀q ∈ [0, 1] : 1√
q
∫ q
0
v(y)
2
√
y
dy ≤ b∗ (62)
We now give a distribution of values, i.e. a function v(·), that satisfies the above
constraint and whose mean µ∗ is at least 2 · b∗ − (b∗)2/H, where H is an externally
assumed upper bound on the distribution of values. If H is large, then this gives an
interval such that the ratio of the upper to the lower bound is of size 2, which is far
from point identification.
Consider a value function v(·), as follows (two point-mass distribution):
v(q) =
{
H if q ≥ θ
0 o.w.
(63)
Then the constraint simplifies to:
b∗ ≥ 1√
q
∫ q
min{θ,q}
H
2
√
y
dy
=
1√
q
H[
√
y]qmin{θ,q} = H
(
1−
√
min{θ, q}
q
)
If θ ≤ q, then this constraint is definitely satisfied, since b∗ ≥ 0. Thus we need to only
check the constraints for q > θ. The tightest of these constraints with respect to θ, is
when q = 1, leading to:
θ ≥
(
H − b∗
H
)2
(64)
By setting θ to be equal to the above lower bound, we get a feasible value function
and this value function has mean:
µ∗ = H(1− θ) = H − (H − b
∗)2
H
=
H2 −H2 − (b∗)2 + 2b∗H
H
= 2b∗ − (b
∗)2
H
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which concludes the point of the example.
A.1 Upper bound on mean of common value
Theorem 15. Let R = Eb∼D [maxi bi] is the expected revenue of a first price auction
when bids are drawn from some BCE and let µ = E[v] be the expected common value.
If we assume that v ∈ [0, H] and that the inverse of the CDF of the distribution of
values is continuously differentiable in [0, H], then it holds that:
µ ≤
√
2n
n− 1H ·R (65)
If we also assume that the inverse of the CDF of values is L-Lipschitz (equivalently
the density of values is bounded below by 1/L), then we don’t need to assume an upper
bound on the distribution and we alternatively get:
µ ≤
√
2n
n− 1
(
1
n
R + L
)
·R = R
√
2
n− 1 +
√
2n
n− 1L ·R (66)
Proof. By the main theorem of Bergemann et al. [2017] we have that if F is the CDF
of common values and H is the CDF of the maximum bid distribution at a BCE, while
v(·) = F−1(·) and B(·) = H−1(·) are the quantile functions of these distributions, then
for any q ∈ [0, 1]:
B(q) ≥ v(q)− 1
qα
∫ v(q)
0
(F (x))αdx (67)
with α = n−1
n
. Let I(q) denote the right hand side.
We first do a change of variables in the integral: let x = v(y). Then dx = v′(y)dy
and since the integral ranges from x ∈ [0, v(q)], in the new variable the integral ranges
from y ∈ [0, q]. Hence:
I(q) = v(q)− 1
qα
∫ q
0
(F (v(y)))αv′(y)dy = v(q)− 1
zα
∫ q
0
yαv′(y)dy (68)
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Applying integration by parts on the integral we have:
I(q) = v(q)− 1
qα
(
[yαv(y)]q0 −
∫ q
0
αyα−1v(y)dy
)
= v(q)− v(q) + 1
qα
∫ q
0
αyα−1v(y)dy
=
1
qα
∫ q
0
αyα−1v(y)dy
Now observe that, µ =
∫ 1
0
v(q)dq. This can be easily verified pictorially, but also
algebraically as follows:
µ =
∫ H
0
1−F (x)dx =
∫ 1
0
(1−F (v(q)))v′(q)dq = [(1−q)v(q)]10+
∫ 1
0
v(q)dq =
∫ 1
0
v(q)dq
(69)
Similarly, R =
∫ 1
0
B(q)dq.
Thus integrating the inequality B(q) ≥ I(q) over q we get:
R ≥
∫ 1
0
1
qα
∫ q
0
αyα−1v(y)dydq (70)
Exchanging the integration order, we get:
R ≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y
1
qα
αyα−1v(y)dqdy =
∫ 1
0
αyα−1v(y)
∫ 1
y
1
qα
dqdy (71)
=
∫ 1
0
αyα−1v(y)
[
q1−α
1− α
]1
y
dy (72)
=
∫ 1
0
α
1− αy
α−1v(y)
(
1− y1−α) dy (73)
=
∫ 1
0
α
1− αv(y)
(
yα−1 − 1) dy (74)
Thus by re-arranging we have that:∫ 1
0
v(y)
(
yα−1 − 1) dy ≤ 1− α
α
R (75)
Therefore if we are given as fixed the revenue of the auction R, then the mean of the
common value distribution can be at most the solution to the following optimization
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program over the set of all possible quantile functions v(·):
max
v(·)∈[0,H]
∫ 1
0
v(y)dy (76)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
v(y)
(
yα−1 − 1) dy ≤ 1− α
α
R (77)
Now consider the function w(y) = yα−1 − 1. This is a monotone decreasing and
non-negative function of y, starting from ∞ at y = 0 and ending at 0 at y = 1.
The goal of the above linear program is to push as much possible value in v(y) as
possible, while satisfying the constraint. Observe that a quantity v(y) is multiplied
by a smaller value in the above constraint than any v(y′) for y′ ≤ y. Thus it is easy to
see that the optimal solution to the above linear program puts as much value on the
high y’s and sets the remainder y’s to zero (another way of arguing this is considering
arbitrarily small discretizations of the y space and then arguing that the solution to
the linear program with respect to v(y), has the above form). Thus the optimal v(·)
takes the form:
v(y) =
{
0 if y ≤ θ
H o.w.
(78)
for some threshold θ ∈ [0, 1].
Thus the optimal value of the above program simplifies to:
max
θ∈[0,1]
H(1− θ) (79)
s.t. H
∫ 1
θ
(
yα−1 − 1) dy ≤ 1− α
α
R (80)
Thus we want to minimize θ, such that:
1− α
α
R
H
≥
∫ 1
θ
(
yα−1 − 1) dy = 1
α
− θ
α
α
− 1 + θ (81)
Case of n = 2 For n = 2, i.e. α = 1/2, we can exactly solve the latter, since it
corresponds to a quadratic inequality, i.e.:
R
H
≥ 1− 2
√
θ + θ = (1−
√
θ)2 (82)
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which yields that:
√
θ ≥ 1−
√
R
H
or equivalently, θ ≥ 1 + R
H
− 2
√
R
H
. Therefore, the
highest possible mean is at most: H(1− θ) = H
(
2
√
R
H
− R
H
)
= 2
√
R ·H −R.
General n. For arbitrary α ∈ [0, 1], we can lower bound the right hand side with a
second order Taylor expansion around θ = 1: i.e. for any θ ∈ [0, 1], for some t ∈ [θ, 1]:
θα = 1 + (θ − 1)α + α(α− 1)
2
tα−2(θ − 1)2 ≤ 1 + (θ − 1)α + α(α− 1)
2
(θ − 1)2 (83)
(since for α ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, 1]: tα−2 ≥ 1 and α ≤ 1) Replacing the above approximation
in the constraint, gives:
1− α
α
R
H
≥ 1
α
− 1
α
− θ + 1− (α− 1)
2
(θ − 1)2 − 1 + θ = 1− α
2
(θ − 1)2 (84)
Simplifying further, we want to minimize θ such that: (θ − 1)2 ≤ 2
α
R
H
. The optimal
value sets:
θ = 1−
√
2
α
R
H
(85)
Leading to a mean of:
µ∗ = H(1− θ) ≤
√
2
α
·R ·H (86)
For the second part of the theorem, we simply observe that if the function v(·) is
L-Lipschitz, then it must be that v(1) ≤ (1− α)R + L, thereby, we can do the exact
same analysis as above, but with H = (1−α)R+L. The upper bound on v(1), comes
from the fact, that if v(·) is lipschitz, then v(y) ≥ v(1)− L(1− y) ≥ v(1)− L. Thus
we have:
1− α
α
R ≥
∫ 1
0
v(y)
(
yα−1 − 1) dy ≥ (v(1)− L)∫ 1
0
(
yα−1 − 1) dy = v(1)− L
α
(87)
Re-arranging gives the property and concludes the proof of the theorem.
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A.2 Upper bound on mean of common value via first order
conditions
We show an upper bound on the mean of the common value from the observed bid
distribution, in the case where bids and their distributions are continuous and admit
a density.
Consider a single player i. We will look at the auction from the perspective of that
player and so we will be dropping the index i. Consider one bid b for player i that
is in the support of the BCE distribution. It must be that this player is maximizing
his utility by submitting b rather than any other bid, when he is recommended to
bid b. Let B denote the random variable that corresponds to the maximum bid of
all players and let Bi be the random variable corresponding to the recommended bid
for player i. Moreover, let GB(·|b) denote the conditional CDF of the maximum bid,
conditional on player i being recommended a bid b, and gB(·|b) be the PDF of this
distribution. Note that even if the bid distribution of the bidders is continuous, both
GB and gb are in general discontinuous at b: for example, gB(b
′|b) = 0 for b′ < b but
gB(b|b) = P (B−i ≤ b|B = b) (where B−i is the maximum bid of the other players),
which can be non-zero. However for b′ > b, we have that
GB(b
′|b) = P [B−i ≤ b′|Bi = b] = GB−i(b′|b) (88)
gB(b
′|b) = gB−i(b′|b) (89)
where gB−i(·|b) is the density of B−i conditional on Bi = b and GB−i(b′|b) the corre-
sponding CDF. This in particular implies that GB(b
′|b) and gB(b′|b) are continuous
for b′ > b, and that
lim
b′→b+
GB(b
′|b) = GB−i(b′|b) (90)
lim
b′→b+
gB(b
′|b) = gB−i(b|b) (91)
as GB and gB are continuous for all b
′.
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Let’s consider the expected utility of a player from deviating to a bid b′ when being
recommended a bid b such that b′ > b (this does not apply for b′ < b):
U(b′|b) = (E[v|B ≤ b′, Bi = b]− b′)GB(b|b) (92)
We get that because b maximizes U(b′|b) for b′ > b, it must be the case that
lim
b′→b+
∂U(b′|b)
∂b′
≤ 0 (93)
First we consider the derivative of the quantity E[v|B ≤ b′, Bi = b]GB(b′|b) for any
b′ > b:
E[v|B ≤ b′, Bi = b]GB(b′|b) = E [v · 1{B ≤ b′} | Bi = b] =
∫ b′
0
(∫ ∞
0
v · f(v|z, b)dv
)
gB(z|b)dz
where f(v|z, b) is the density of the conditional distribution of the common value,
conditional on B = z and Bi = b. Thus the derivative of the latter with respect to b
′
is simply:
∂E[v|B ≤ b′, Bi = b]GB(b′|b)
∂b′
=
(∫ ∞
0
v · f(v|b′, b)dv
)
gB(b
′|b) = E[v|B = b′, Bi = b]gB(b′|b)
Combining with the derivative of the term b′GB(b′|b) we get:
lim
b′→b+
(
E[v|B = b′, Bi = b]gB(b′|b)− b′gB(b′|b)−GB(b′|b)
) ≤ 0 (94)
Re-arranging yields:
lim
b′→b+
E[v|B = b′, Bi = b] ≤ lim
b′→b+
b′ +
limb′→b+ GB(b′|b)
limb′→b+ gB(b′|b) (95)
Using equations (88), (89), (90) and (91), we obtain:
lim
b′→b+
E[v|B = b′, Bi = b] ≤ b+ GB−i(b|b)
gB−i(b|b)
(96)
Note that assuming continuity of f(v|b′, b) (i.e. the joint distribution of realized value
and bids is continuous), we have continuity of E[v|B = b′, Bi = b] = E[v|B−i ≤
b′, Bi = b] for all b′ and we can write:
E[v|B = b, Bi = b] ≤ b+ GB−i(b|b)
gB−i(b|b)
(97)
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Assuming any two players never play the same bid at the same time with non-zero
probability (this happens as long as gB−i(·|b) is not degenerate for all bids b and all
players i), we have that for all b, the events (B = b, Bi = b) are disjoint across possible
values of i and b (only one can happen at a time). Additionally, there always exist a
player i such that B = b, Bi = b for some bid b, hence at least one of the events must
happen. So exactly one of (B = b, Bi = b) happens at a time for all possible bids b
and bidders i, and we can condition on said events:
E[v] =
∫
b
∑
i
E[v|B = b, Bi = b]P [B = b, Bi = b]db (98)
Plugging in Equation (97), we get:
E[v] ≤
∑
i
∫
b
(
b+
GB−i(b|b)
gB−i(b|b)
) ·GiB(b|b)gBi(b)db
= R +
∑
i
∫
b
GiB(b|b)2
gB−i(b|b)
· gBi(b)db
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